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Afterword: Voices and Violence-
A Dialogue
Ellen Wright Clayton*
Jay Clayton**
WE: When organizing this Symposium on the topic of "Law, Literature,
and Social Change," we asked whether current trends in literature and
in literary, social, and legal theory actually could play a role in bringing
about social change. The authors gathered at this Symposium re-
sponded to this question in very different ways. As we read their arti-
cles and comments, however, and as we talked about their various
approaches, some common themes began to emerge. Narrative seemed
important. The way people split public life off from private experience
came up frequently. But violence seemed to be on everyone's mind.
IT: Why violence?
SHE: It's in our world. Randy DeShaney, who figures prominently in
Martha Minow's contribution to this Symposium, beat his three-year-
old son Joshua almost to death.1
HE: It's in our selves. Who we are depends on what we exclude.2
SHE: A father nearly killed his child and that sort of violence is any-
thing but rare. Millions of women, children, and the elderly are beaten
or neglected or sexually abused in this country every year. Violence
characterizes the relations of one person with another in less overt
ways, too. In the areas where I spend much of my time, it occurs when a
physician uses the threat of law to coerce a patient's "compliance" or
when a doctor is condescending toward a patient or tries to convince
her to act against her wishes. It occurs when a professor humiliates a
student. It occurs when a student thinks that the poor are inherently
more likely to cheat the government and are less entitled to the security
of their homes.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Vanderbilt University.
** Associate Professor of English, Vanderbilt University. The Authors would like to thank
Mona Frederick for her help in organizing this Symposium.
1. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. '998 (1989).
2. For expressions of this widely shared view of the self from the perspectives of anthropol-
ogy, African-American studies, literary criticism, and cultural studies respectively, see J. FABIAN,
TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJEcT (1983); S. GREENBLATT, RENAISSANCE
SELF-FASHIONING: FROM MORE TO SHAKESPEARE (1980); "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE (H. Gates
ed. 1986); E. SAID, ORIENTALISM 1-3, 45 (1979).
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The law itself is violent, as Robert Cover so often reminded us.3
The institutions of the law-legislatures, courts, police, prisons, and by
extension, social agencies-exercise force, both actively and passively.
Martha Minow points out that the Supreme Court, by failing to hear
Joshua's cries, by characterizing the acts of his father as "private," by
ignoring the fact that the State of Wisconsin created its social service
system in a manner that eliminated any alternative recourse for Joshua,
by declining to notice that abuse of our children affects society as a
whole, is violent and is blind to the violence of other institutions.4
IT: Such an elastic conception of violence turns any effort to impose
form into an exercise in force.
HE: Michael Ryan's article focuses on the violence of representation.
The word is a pun in his usage, one with a rich history. In literary par-
lance "representation" means the use of words or images to stand for
something else. In political discourse representation refers to a specific
way of organizing a democracy. In both it names a procedure in which a
part stands in for a whole. It used to be thought that this procedure was
relatively benign, a substitution that was potentially fair, accurate, and
efficient, one that always could be corrected by judicious criticism or by
an adequate system of checks and balances. With the poststructuralist
revolution to which Ryan refers at the beginning of his first section,5
this substitution began to look more like a violent displacement. From a
poststructuralist perspective, both political and cultural forms of repre-
sentation appear to exclude or silence as much as to enfranchise or
communicate.
The stories we tell about our Nation's commitment to political
freedom, Ryan argues, sustain an economic order in which the over-
whelming majority of those who labor are not free, an order that li-
censes the powerful to violate the interests of the weak. Such dominant
representations, moreover, occlude other visions of the world. Thus, the
dominant story of freedom in America enshrines a world in which peo-
ple are viewed as independent actors, each looking out for his own good
without regard for the other. This representation makes it hard to envi-
sion alternative versions of freedom, more communal conceptions of a
society in which people care for and depend upon one another. Free-
3. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, Violence];
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4
(1983) [hereinafter Cover, The Supreme Court]. For a discussion of this aspect of Cover's work,
see Epstein, Rhetoric of Silence: Some Reflections on Law, Literature, and Social Violence, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (1990); Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert M. Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860 (1987).
4. See Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family
Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1666-76 (1990).
5. Ryan, Social Violence and Political Representation, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1990).
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dom, in short, is one of our sustaining fictions, and like all fictions, is
partial rather than universal, constructed rather than natural. One
name for such sustaining fictions is "ideology."
OTHER VOICES: "[T]he American commitment to the ideology of
freedom has contributed to social progress and the limitation of repres-
sion. . ." (Mari Matsuda).'
SHE: All violence is not so abstract. Like Minow, Ryan writes of do-
mestic violence, of battered children, abused women, angry men. He
tells us about the victims of violence, about how representations play a
decisive role in their suffering, causing them to see their oppression as
natural, often as something they have brought on themselves. In his
most recent book, he discusses his own experience as a battered child.7
IT: G. Edward White's contribution to the Symposium does not men-
tion violence at all.
SHE: We know from White's other work on Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes8 that one of the organizing principles of Holmes's jurisprudence
was the general legitimacy of majority rule and the illegitimacy of judi-
cial intervention to protect those injured by the actions of the majority.
Scholars argue about the source of Holmes's position, some alleging
that he was elitist or antihumanitarian9 and others claiming that his
deference to the will of the majority sprang either from his awareness of
the indeterminacy of values and beliefs10 or from his positivist accep-
tance of the realities of power." But wherever it came from, Holmes's
reluctance to challenge established values led him to be insensitive to
the social violence inflicted by the majority on the weak, the poor, the
disenfranchised, and the mentally retarded.
OTHER VOICES: "[C]ontinuity with the past is only a necessity and
not a duty" (Oliver Wendell Holmes). 2
HE: When one reads White's account of how isolated and compartmen-
talized Holmes's life was, it is hardly surprising that he did not respond
6. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320, 2353 (1989).
7. M. RYAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE: WORKING HYPOTHESES FOR A POST-REVOLUTIONARY SocI-
ErY 200-34 (1989).
8. See G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 150-77 (rev. ed. 1988); White, Look-
ing at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 LAW & HIsT. REV. 439, 462 (1986) [hereinafter Holmes in the
Mirror]; White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964).
10. See, e.g., F. KELLOGG, THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES (1984); Holmes in the
Mirror, supra note 8, at 464.
11. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 49 (1977); Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 793-94 (1989); Holmes in the Mirror, supra note 8, at 452.
12. O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 226
(1920); see also Grey, supra note 11, at 807-10. For comments on Holmes's conception of the im-
portance of duty, see Elshtain, Private Lives, Public Selves, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1763 (1990).
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to oppression. Holmes apparently viewed judging, even on the collegial
courts on which he sat, as a solitary job consisting of wrestling with a
case to find the "same old donkey of a question of law"13 and then writ-
ing an elegant resolution. He viewed this labor not only as solitary but
also as narrowly intellectual, seeking to exclude the influence of emo-
tion and empathy at all cost. 14 He devoted much effort to his work,
perhaps because of his desire to achieve lasting eminence as a jurist,
but when his job was done, he left it behind."5 At home he lived almost
as a recluse, engaging in little social activity in Boston or in Washing-
ton. According to White, Holmes really seemed to come alive only in his
extraordinary correspondence. In these letters he rarely talked about
his work as a judge. He wrote primarily about literature and history,
which he read voluminously. Even these letters had an air of detach-
ment about them because he set the limits of the discussion. Some-
times, in fact, Holmes seemed to be engaged in conversation with
himself. From White's perspective, Holmes's life can be seen as a series
of violent separations-self from others, emotion from intellect, work
from play, intellectual life outside the Court from his work within. The
maintenance of such artificial divisions must have been costly both for
him personally and for his jurisprudence.
It is costly for others as well. Minow shows the same dichotomy
between public and private experience 6 at work in Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist's majority opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.1" By criticizing the habit of mind that
sees violence as private, she enables us to see the violence exercised by
a public agency when it fails to act. In the process, she calls into ques-
tion the distinction between governmental action and inaction that the
majority used to justify their decision. Further, she poses Justice Wil-
liam Brennan's dissenting opinion as a similar deconstruction of the as-
sumptions that governed the majority's reasoning.'" The literary critic
Shoshana Felman has shown that readers' debates about how to inter-
pret a text tend to mirror the conflicts staged in the text; hence, readers
are often caught up in a transferential relation with the text, even when
they believe themselves to be standing back dispassionately and inter-
preting the issues objectively. 19 In much the same fashion, Justice Bren-
13. See White, Holmes As Correspondent, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1707, 1750 (1990).
14. See id. at 1754-55.
15. For a more sympathetic view of Holmes's detachment from his role as judge, see Grey,
supra note 11, at 845-47.
16. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1667-68.
17. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
18. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1670.
19. See Felman, Turning the Screw of Interpretation, 55/56 YALE FRENCH STUD. 94 (1977).
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nan argues that the Court is caught up in the very conflict it is
attempting to resolve. The Court's choice not to act mirrored the social
agency's refusal to respond to Joshua DeShaney's plight.
OTHER VOICES: "Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief
and if believed it is acted on . . ." (Oliver Wendell Holmes).20
SHE: Cornel West, in his contribution to the Symposium, refuses to
lose sight of social misery. His article keeps returning to the "ill-fed, ill-
clad, and ill-housed."'" For them violence may be a form of "civil ter-
rorism," the "last resort of desperate people."22 West sees the self-de-
feating, self-destructive aspect of this violence, but he also recognizes it
as form of rebellion, of anarchic expression. People so marginalized, so
oppressed that their chief forms of expression lie in a violence turned
largely on themselves and in an illicit market in drugs, alcohol, and
bodies can be described only as tragic. Yet West holds out some hope
for radical change-if the time ever comes when oppressed people can
transform their capacity to produce social chaos into genuine political
action.
OTHER VOICES: "In order to perpetuate itself, every oppression must
corrupt or distort those various sources of power within the culture of
the oppressed that can provide energy for change" (Audre Lorde).2 3
HE: Until that time, however, West looks for social change not through
electoral politics or the courts but through movements that are "extra-
parliamentary '24 in character. This emphasis on social rather than po-
litical movements is in keeping with a major trend in postmodernism,
which West's other work has done much to further,25 the tendency to
celebrate unofficial sociocultural movements, 6 local struggles,27 the
counter-disciplinary procedures of practice, 2 and the tactics of every-
day life.29 This thread of postmodernism respects the power of what the
novelist Toni Morrison has called "discredited" forms of knowledge,30
20. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
21. See West, The Role of Law in Progressive. Politics, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1797, 1799, 1801,
1805 (1990).
22. See id. at 1800.
23. A. LORDE, Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power, in SISTER OUTSIDER 53 (1984).
24. See West, supra note 21, at 1800.
25. See C. WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATIsM 211-
39 (1989).
26. See J. KRISTEVA, Women's Time, in THE KRISTEVA READER 187, 190 (1986).
27. See M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-
1977, at 126, 132 (1980).
28. See P. BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977).
29. See M. DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1984).
30. Morrison, An Interview, 24 CONTEMP. LITERATURE 413, 428 (1983). For a discussion of
alternative forms from a legal point of view, see Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
1990] 1811
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the unofficial ways of knowing and doing that marginalized groups often
must employ. West mentions rap artists,3' and Minow turns to popular
music*3 2 but they both have in mind "naive" or indigenous cultural
forms that seem to do a better job of dealing with the suffering of pow-
erless people than do official "high" culture or the judicial system."
In this project narrative plays a major role. West exhorts progres-
sive lawyers to learn from other disempowered peoples how to tell "ena-
bling" or "analytically illuminating" stories.34 Here he makes common
cause with many minority legal scholars-particularly those who iden-
tify with the movement known as Critical Race Theory-in arguing
that stories serve a strategic function in oppositional intellectual activ-
ity.35 Through narrative, lawyers can keep alive the memory of progres-
sive victories in the past and provide a basis for change in the future.
West is somewhat unusual among theorists of postmodernism in
stressing the positive value of memory and tradition 6 for a radical
politics. Unlike many literary and cultural theorists, who view narrative
as complicit with authority because of its linear, teleological, and uni-
fied character,37 West proposes a legal practice that is "narrative in
character and radical in content."38
Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and feminist legal
scholars have borrowed fruitfully from literary theorists, employing
poststructuralist models of interpretation and of narrative to unsettle
the dominant conventions of their discipline. Literary critics have be-
gun to return the favor, writing on the law and drawing on legal con-
cepts with increasing frequency, 9 in large part because the law gives
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 344-45 (1987).
31. See West, supra note 21, at 1802.
32. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1695-99.
33. For more on the importance of "discredited" forms of knowledge in both postmodern
theory and minority literatures, see Clayton, The Narrative Turn in Recent Minority Fiction, 2
AM. LITERARY HisT. 375 (1990).
34. See West, supra note 21, at 1802.
35. See Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411 (1989); Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2320; see also Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). See generally
Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
36. See West, supra note 21, at 1804; see also West, Reassessing the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 34 Loy. L. REV. 265, 273 (1988) (arguing for the importance of preserving traditions of
resistance).
37. See, e.g., E. SAID, BEGINNINGS: INTENTION AND METHOD 66 (1975); Miller, Narrative and
History, 41 ENG. LIT. HIST. 455, 459-60, 467 (1974); White, The Value of Narrativity in the Repre-
sentation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY 5, 17 (1980).
38. See West, supra note 21, at 1802.
39. See, e.g., J. CULLER, Deconstruction and the Law, in FRAMING THE SIGN: CRITICISM AND
ITS INSTITUTIONS 139-52 (1988); S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERA-
TURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988); M. RYAN, supra note 7;
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them a chance to deal with texts that seem directly connected to social
and political concerns. If legal scholars look to literary theory to remind
themselves of the "textuality" of the law, literary critics turn to the law
to convince themselves that the interpretation of texts has some "real"
consequences. This interchange is one of the most valuable examples of
the interdisciplinary impulse that characterizes intellectual activity at
the beginning of the 1990s. But literary critics have been slower than
legal scholars to let the questions raised by the other discipline chal-
lenge their findings. Narrative theorists, for instance, could learn much
from the work of some legal scholars who are sensitive to the varying
political contexts of narrative discourse.
Robert Cover,4" Stephen L. Winter,41 Richard Delgado,42 Mar Mat-
suda,43 and other legal scholars attend to the specific historical set-
ting-the social and institutional contexts-of storytelling before
attempting to assess the form's political value. Winter, to look at one of
these scholars, argues that the narrative is "an iconoclastic tool" of "le-
gal and social change" because it is not the principal method that insti-
tutions use to legitimate themselves.44 "Narrative does not meet the
threefold demands of generality, unreflexivity, and reliability that are
necessary if a prevailing order is credibly to justify itself."'45 Winter's
perspective would present a useful challenge to poststructuralist narra-
tive theorists, among whom there is a general consensus that narrative
is a prop of the status quo and that the disruption of narrative is, in
and of itself, politically liberating.
OTHER VOICES: "You don't have anything / if you don't have the
stories" (Leslie Marmon Silko).4
SHE: Sometimes I wonder if narrative really has any effect on behavior.
How do we know that telling the story of violence makes a difference?
The example that comes most immediately to my mind is that of medi-
cal training, an experience that is often demeaning and humiliating. 47
One need look only to the flurry of books written in recent years by
Caserio, Supreme Court Discourse vs. Homosexual Fiction, 88 S. ATLANTIC Q. 267 (1989). For criti-
cism of this exchange, see R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
40. See Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 3, at 16-17, 18, 44-45.
41. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989).
42. See Delgado, supra note 35, at 2414-15.
43. See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2324-25.
44. Winter, supra note 41, at 2228.
45. Id.
46. L. SILKO, CEREMONY 2 (1977).
47. Investigators recently have begun to study the ill treatment of medical students. See, e.g.,
Sheehan, Sheehan, White, Leibowitz & Baldwin, A Pilot Study of Medical Student 'Abuse,' 263 J.
A.M.A. 533 (1990); Silver & Glicken, Medical Student Abuse: Incidence, Severity, and Signifi-
cance, 263 J. A.M.A. 527 (1990).
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people recounting their own medical school and residency training.48
Their accounts abound with tales of how they have been degraded even
though some of the authors seem eerily unaware of how fully they have
been demeaned. Yet we know that this systematic humiliation is not
without consequences. The stories of how doctors come to view their
patients as "gomers" and admissions as "hits" demonstrate that it is
hard to care for others when you yourself are being brutalized. It is also
difficult for the physician with an ego made fragile by assault to re-
spond to uncertainty and complexity as anything other than a threat.4 9
In addition, it is plainly true that patients die unnecessarily when resi-
dents are pushed beyond their limits, as allegations regarding the death
of Libby Zion made all too clear.5 We know all this, we tell ourselves
these stories, and yet we seem unable to transform medicine into a hu-
mane institution. To be sure, the economic cost of providing less stress-
ful work schedules is a major barrier to change. But a large part of the
resistance to change is the fact that many physicians believe that strin-
gent working conditions are necessary to turn students and residents
into "special" people,5 even though I would contend and the stories
show that this very "specialness," this sense of being different because
one has done things that others have not, contributes to the insensitiv-
ity with which physicians sometimes treat their patients.
Minow, too, asks whether telling stories makes a difference, and she
asks the question in a striking way.5 2 She recounts her experiences in a
program at Brandeis University in which she discusses literature with
judges. They often are deeply engaged in the conversation and some-
times have remarkable insights and draw striking parallels between the
stories and their own work.53 Yet she worries. She worries that she may
be too bound by academic notions of what it is to respond sensitively to
a text, that she and they may be missing the possibility that none of
them truly understands the story, that the real wisdom may be in not
knowing what to say. Finally, she implicitly wonders whether this sort
48. See, e.g., M. HARRISON, A WOMAN IN RESIDENCE (1982); P. KLASS, A NOT ENTIRELY BENIGN
PROCEDURE: FOUR YEARS AS A MEDICAL STUDENT (1987); P. REILLY, To Do No HARM: A JOURNEY
THROUGH MEDICAL SCHOOL (1987); S. SHEM, HOUSE OF GOD (1981).
49. Cf. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 165-206 (1984) (arguing that
difficulty in confronting uncertainty affects almost all interactions between doctors and patients).
50. Asch & Parker, The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two Steps Backward?, 318
NEw ENG. J. MED. 771 (1988); see also Ritchie, Professionalism, Altruism, and Overwork, 13 J.
MED. & PHIL. 447 (1988) (arguing that overworking residents is not ethically justifiable).
51. See, e.g., Bergman, DeAngelis, Feigin & Stockman, Regulation of Working Hours for Pe-
diatric Residents, 116 J. PEDIATRICS 478 (1990). Even some of my close friends and medical col-
leagues defend this position vigorously.
52. See Minow, supra note 4, at 1686-94.
53. Sometimes, however, they seem to miss the point altogether as her hilarious footnote
about the tribulations of teaching Camus demonstrates. Id. at 1694 n. 147.
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of discussion actually changes what the judges do when they return to
the bench.
IT: The same question could be raised about all intellectual activities,
both within and outside the academy.
HE: I still take heart from this kind of exchange. Until the last decade,
how often did faculty in law schools-as well as lawyers and judges
outside of the academic community-read, teach, and debate scholars
in the humanities? How often did literary critics think about issues be-
yond the confines of their discipline? This Symposium-like others
around the country54-represents a fundamental reorganization of intel-
lectual boundaries. Even though the university is still divided into de-
partments and schools, it often has responded favorably to the
interdisciplinary turn, a turn many critics identify with post-
modernism. 5
OTHER VOICES: "Since the salient feature of postmodernism is
thought to be incoherence, why not use this very word in an incoherent
way? . . . (Others, it is true, claim this same incoherence . . for the
discourse that reigns supreme in the humanities centers of American
universities)" (Tzvetan Todorov).
SHE: It does not hurt that we are married to each other and that we
talk about our work at home. The formal recognition of this dialogue
parallels one of the most significant changes in the way the law views
families. Well into this century, marriage legally extinguished the voice
and identity of the wife. She could not enforce any claims against her
spouse during the course of the ongoing marriage.57 If some third party
injured her, she could rarely sue in her own name. As some have said,
54. See, e.g., Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Symposium: Law and
Literature, 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373
(1982); Symposium: Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Cardozo School of Law, Oct. 2-
3, 1989; Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, UniVersity of
Southern Cal. Law Center, Feb. 23-24, 1990.
55. For critics who view the interdisciplinary impulse as an important aspect of postmodern-
ism, see L. HUTCHEON, A POETICS OF POSTMODERNISM: HISTORY, THEORY, FICTION 9 (1988); J.-F.
LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 52 (1984); and Jameson,
Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CULTURE
111 (H. Foster ed. 1983). For an influential discussion of the interdisciplinary turn in anthropology
and the social sciences, see C. GEERTz, Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought, in
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19-35 (1983).
56. Todorov, Postmodernism, a Primer, NEW REPUBLIC, May 21, 1990, at 32.
57. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) (denying wife's claim
for maintenance and support from well-to-do husband); see also Finley, A Break in the Silence:
Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 45-48 (1989) (discussing
evolution of intrafamily immunity in torts).
58. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1910) (discussing common-law posi-
tion that married women had no legal existence apart from their husbands and limited encroach-
ment on that rule by Married Women's Property Acts). See generally Williams, The Equality
1990] 1815
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husband and wife were merged into one upon marriage, and that one
was the man. 9 Only recently has the law started to come, however halt-
ingly, to realize that there are two people in a marriage, each with an
independent voice and interests. As we already have seen, dialogue is
possible only when there is more than one voice in the room.
HE: Although there always have been many voices in the room, some
have been muted unfairly. Feminists,e0 gay and lesbian critics," and
scholars of minority literature62 have taught us to listen more carefully,
to hear the altered emphases, the ironies, the significant absences,
which are some of the marks of unauthorized voices struggling to be
heard. Literary critics have concentrated primarily on recovering these
muted texts in the literature of the past, but contemporary scholarly
conventions also may serve to exclude some voices. Many people are
arguing that the "dominant discourse" of scholarship works to silence
alternative voices, stifle the prospects for radical change. 3 This kind of
critique lies behind many of the experiments in scholarly writing with
storytelling, nonlinear arguments, fragmentation, collage, autobiogra-
phy, and dialogue. 4
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OTHER VOICES: "Nothing remains from a desublimated meaning or a
destructured form; an emancipatory effect does not follow" (Jtirgen
Habermas) 65
SHE: In medicine coauthored articles are the norm. Most of these
pieces are linear in structure and seem to speak with one voice. We each
have written such multiauthored, allegedly univocal papers before and
can attest to the often protracted negotiations and compromises neces-
sary to reach the final product. But Mikhail Bakhtin teaches us that all
writing is dialogic, even when composed by a single author." Every
text, no matter how tightly organized, is implicitly in dialogue with
other texts. In this Afterword, we want to make the different perspec-
tives visible. This allows us not only to express our points of view but
also implicitly to acknowledge that there are voices which are not heard
here even though they have clear and legitimate claims to participate in
the conversation.
OTHER VOICES: "One's racial (gender, religious, regional) identity is
no substitute for the disciplined study essential to achieving expertise"
(Randall L. Kennedy).61
HE: This strategy attempts to combat the problem of representation
that Michael Ryan notes. Admitting the existence of many voices may
undermine the persuasiveness of unifying myths. It also may reveal how
even the individual voice is constructed by other voices she has heard,
other texts she has read.
OTHER VOICES: "Dialogical modes are not, in principle, autobio-
graphical; they need not lead to hyper self-consciousness or self-absorp-
tion" (James Clifford).6
SHE: And we remain inventions in our writing, constructed characters,
whether we strive for the invisible cloak of neutrality or attempt openly
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multiplicity of the female subject); J. KRISTEVA, Stabat Mater, in THE KRISTEVA READER 160-86
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21, 127-67 (1989) (exploring autobiography and narrative as vehicles for anthropology).
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to incorporate autobiography into our scholarship. We-"HE" and
"SHE"-are fictions. We have been written. Both of us have composed
parts of each voice in this dialogue, and both have revised the words of
,the other.
IT: Whose voice am I?
WE: Our own, of course, and that of others as well. The internalized
voice of the Other, if you like, which Lacan says is the origin of the
unconscious,19 of everything that must be repressed if the self is to
speak at all. The Idiot Questioner, perhaps. "Id" is Freud's term.7 0 But
if we allow ourselves to believe in the therapeutic hope that both Freud
and Bakhtin invested, in very different ways, in dialogue itself, then
perhaps "Where It was, We shall be."''1
69. See J. LACAN, ECRITs: A SELECTION 55, 172 (1977).
70. See S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 13 (1962).
71. See S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 80 (1965) (stating,
"Where id was, there ego shall be").
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